

POSC 695 (Social Science Theory)

Spring 2002

Wednesdays, 5:00-7:50

VKC 103

Institutions and Politics

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Since the ancient Greeks, institutions have been central to political analysis. In contemporary professional political science, often under the guise of claims to a “new institutionalism,” research addressed explicitly to institutions and their consequences dominates mainstream debates. This course surveys the leading institutionalist approaches to politics, and examines a selection of the most important research questions in both American and Comparative Politics that institutionalist analyses continue to define. The general aim is understand both the possibilities and the limitations of institutionalist approaches to political science. Our analysis will focus especially on the historical dimension that is critical to institutional analysis, and on the ways that institutions mediate relations between state and society.

The course begins with a survey of recent attempts to sum up and define the new institutionalism. In addition to several general works in this vein, we examine the various approaches to institutions that have emerged from rational choice theory, from sociological and cultural work on institutions and from historical analysis of political development. The course then samples several of the many specific domains of political science where institutionalism has played a crucial role in recent debates.

The first such section examines classic debates that recent institutionalist work has revived about the role of governmental institutions in politics: the different possibilities for crafting constitutional orders, the consequences of the choice of presidential or parliamentary institutions for governmental stability, and the implications of divided government for politics in the United States and elsewhere. In the next section we consider the role of institutions in state-society relations through sessions on working class formation in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, on contemporary party systems, and on varieties of welfare states and capitalism. The final section of the course turns to the exploding literature on such subjects as federalism, decentralization, and the local logics of governance by means of institutions.

Readings

The following required books have been ordered and should be available at the Bookstore.

- Joel F. Handler, *Down from Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and Empowerment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
- Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg (eds.), *Working-Class Formation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986).
- Herbert Kitschelt, Peter Lange, John D. Stephens and Gary Marks (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999).
- Paul E. Peterson, *The Price of Federalism*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).
- George Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
- Jefferey M. Sellers, *Governing from Below* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

All books with required reading will also be on reserve at Leavey Library. We will discuss in the first class section whether the articles and book excerpts besides those in the books listed above will be made available as a reader in addition to copies on reserve in Leavey.

In most of the domains we will cover, the required readings only offer glimpses of a much more extensive body of work. For this reason, the reading list also includes a sampling of additional readings for those interested in exploring the issues raised in required readings further.

Assignments

Requirements for the course, in addition to responsibilities for leading discussion of part of the readings, will center around two short reviews of readings for separate weeks (5-6 pages) and one final paper of 10-12 pages.

Each review should develop a critical analytical perspective on part the readings for the relevant week. You will also be required to give your analysis orally in a 15-minute class presentation. The presentation and written analysis should pose general questions for seminar discussion as well as specific questions about each reading, and presenters will be expected to lead discussion on those questions. Initial sign-ups for topics will take place in our first session. These papers will be due **no later than 24 hours in advance of the seminar meeting time**. By this time, in addition to leaving a copy in the instructor's mailbox, you will be expected to post

the text of your paper electronically for the other seminar participants at the Blackboard website for the course (accessible using your Unix ID and password (same as for your USC e-mail) at <http://learn.usc.edu>). If seminar enrollment requires students to prepare more than two such analyses, only two (of your choice) will be graded.

The final paper will consist of a research proposal, and will be due at the close of business on the first day of exam period (April 30). In this assignment, applying literature and concepts from the course as well as additional research, you will develop and justify a project. You will not be expected to carry out the project, but to design a project that you would carry out with the appropriate resources and time. A handout will be distributed with further specifics about this assignment, and each student will be expected to meet with the instructor to discuss the proposal.

Weighting of assignments will be as follows:

First review: 20%
Second review: 20%
Class discussion: 20%
Final paper: 40%

This list of assignments is based on the assumption that all students will do all the required reading, attend all classes and participate regularly and constructively in discussions. Failure to do any of these tasks will be considered just cause for lowering of your final grade.

Any student requesting academic accommodations based on a disability is required to register with Disability Services and Programs (DSP) each semester. A letter of verification for approved accommodations can be obtained from DSP. Please be sure the letter is delivered to me (or to TA) as early in the semester as possible. DSP is located in STU 301 and is open 8:30 a.m. - 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. The phone number for DSP is (213) 740-0776.

Reading List

(With examples of questions for each week)

January 9: **Introduction**

PART I: WHAT IS THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM?

January 16: **Is There a Core?**

1. How does institutionalism differ from other approaches to political and social science?
2. Is there a common set of concerns, issues or arguments in institutionalism?

3. What is new about the new institutionalism?
4. How does institutionalism in different social sciences differ?

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms". *Political Studies* 44: 936-57 (1996).

James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life" *American Political Science Review* 78(3): 734-49 (1984).

Ellen Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism" *Politics and Society* 26:5-34 (1998).

Further recommended reading:

James Caporaso and David Levine, *Theories of Political Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), Ch. 6.

Peter Hall, *Governing the Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), Ch. 1.

Terry Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 6: 213-53 (1990).

Peter Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* (1968).

Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 1-62.

Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back in: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Peter B. Evans and Theda Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the State Back in* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 3-43.

Other essays in Skocpol, Rueschemeyer and Evans.

Philip Selznick, "Institutionalism Old and New," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 41: 270-277 (1996).

January 23: **Rational Choice and Institutionalism**

1. How do models of rational choice theory (cycling, structure-induced equilibrium, transactions costs, veto players) seek to explain political processes?
2. What role do institutions play in these explanations? Why do students of this tradition set forth their own version of new institutionalism?
3. What makes rational choice arguments more, or less, persuasive?
4. What are the weaknesses of rational choice approaches? What aspects of institutions do they neglect?

William H. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," *American Political Science Review* 74: 432-450 (1980).

Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2): 131-147 (1989).

Douglas C. North, "A Transaction Cost Theory of Politics," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 2(4): 355-367 (1990).

George Tsebelis, "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," *British Journal of Political Science* 25: 289-325 (1995).

Further recommended reading:

Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1951).

R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," *Economica* (1937).

R.H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," *Journal of Law and Economics* (1960).

Keith Dowding, "The Compatibility of Behaviouralism, Rational Choice and Institutionalism," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 6[1]: 105-17 (1994).

Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper Collins, 1957).

Jeffrey Friedman (ed.), *The Rational Choice Controversy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).

Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, *Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

William Riker, "Political Science and Rational Choice." In Joseph Alt and Kenneth Shepsle (eds.), *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*.

Todd Sandler, *Economic Concepts for the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Kenneth Shepsle, "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions." In Herbert F. Weisberg (ed.), *Political Science: The Science of Politics*, pp. 51-81.

Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, *Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions* (New York: Norton, 1997).

George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Fritz W. Scharpf, *Games Real Actors Play: Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997).

Oliver Williamson, *The Economic Institutions of Capitalism* (New York: Free Press, 1985).

January 30: **Sociological and Culturalist Variants of Institutionalism**

1. What does the new institutionalism mean in sociology? How does it differ from previous study of organizations?
2. What does it mean to view states and other institutions in terms of culture? How can this approach go beyond previous ones? Where does it require us to look to explain politics?
3. What are the weaknesses of culturalist and sociological approaches to institutions?
4. What lessons does institutionalism hold for the Law and Society tradition? How can Law and Society add to the understanding of institutions?

Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, "Introduction." In . Ed. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (eds.) *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 1-33.

George Steinmetz (ed.), *State/Culture* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999) (pp. 1-50, 53-75, 98-118, 123-144, 291-320, 407-419 (essays by Steinmetz, Bourdieu, Adams, Meyer, Laitin, Tilly).

Mark C. Suchman and Lauren B. Edelman, "Legal Rational Myths: The New Institutionalism and the Law and Society Tradition," *Law and Social Inquiry* 21:4 (Fall, 1996): 903-941.

Further recommended reading:

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Verso, 1991).

Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Sociology* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998).

Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. In . Ed. Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell (eds.) *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).

Other essays in DiMaggio and Powell.

Mary Douglas, *How Institutions Think* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986).

February 6: **History and Institutionalism**

1. Is historical institutionalism distinct from rational choice, sociological and culturalist variants? If so how?
2. What role does time play in institutions and their effects? Does studying institutions and their effects historically make a difference in our understanding of how they operate?
3. What types of historical institutional processes should comprise the main focus in studies of development: stability or change?
4. What kinds of evidentiary demands does historical institutionalism make? How do these differ from those in other approaches?

Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," in Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longstreth (eds.), *Structuring Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 1-32.

Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 251-268 (2000).

Douglas C. North, "Economic Performance Through Time," in Mary C. Brinton and Victor Nee (eds.), *The New Institutionalism in Sociology* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), pp. 247-257.

Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek, "Beyond the Iconography of Order: Notes for a "New Institutionalism," in Lawrence C. Dodd and Calvin Jillson (eds.), *The Dynamics of American Politics: Approaches and Interpretations* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

Robert Bates, et al. *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 3-18, 231-236.

Further recommended reading:

Colin Hay and Daniel Wincott, "Structure, Agency and Historical Institutionalism," *Political Studies* 46: 951-957 (1998).

Douglas C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981).

Douglas C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (1990).

B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, "Institutions and Time: Problems of Conceptualization," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 8: 565-83 (1998).

Lanzara, Giovan Francesco. 1998. "Self-destructive Processes in Institution Building and Some Modest Countervailing Mechanisms." *European Journal of Political Research* 33 (1998):1-39.

Kathy Thelen, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 369-404 (1999).

John Zysman, "How Institutions Create Historically Rooted Trajectories of Growth," *Industrial and Corporate Change* (1994).

PART II: PROBLEMS OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

February 13: **Constitutional Orders**

1. How does Lijphart develop his institutional typology? What ties the institutional attributes of democracies together? How does his analysis compare with earlier philosophical accounts of Aristotle, Montesquieu or Madison?
2. What are the most fundamental lines along which modern democratic political systems differ? What difference do those differences make?
3. How do the rational choice (North and Weingast) and culturalist (Sohrabi) analyses of constitutional orders differ from that of Lijphart in modes of analysis, in use of evidence, and in conclusions?
4. Is democracy a matter of institutional design?

Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 1-61, 243-309.

André Kaiser, Types of Democracy: From Classical to New Institutionalism. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 9[4], 419-44. 1997.

Douglas C. North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Collective Choice in 17th-Century England," *Journal of Economic History* 49: 803-832 (1989).

Nader Sohrabi, "Revolution and State Culture: The Circle of Justice and Constitutionalism in 1906 Iran," in Steinmetz, pp. 253-286.

Further recommended reading:

The Federalist

Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad (eds.), *Constitutionalism and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Leslie Goldstein, *Constituting Federal Sovereignty* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000).

Russell Hardin, "Why a Constitution?" In Bernard Grofman and Donald Witman (eds.), *The Federalist Papers and the New Institutionalism* (New York: Agathon, 1989).

Barry Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," *American Political Science Review* 91(2): (1997).

February 20: **Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Divided Government**

1. How does the distinction between presidential and parliamentary government affect Lijphart's typology and the conclusions he draws?
2. Does Presidential or Parliamentary government undermine the stability of democracies more? Why?
3. Does divided government under U.S. presidentialism undermine the effectiveness of policymaking and legislation?
4. How do Mainwaring/Carey and Linz go about arguing whether either of these forms of government is best? What else could explain the differences that presidentialism and divided government seem to make?

Juan J. Linz, "Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference?," in Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Government* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 3-74

Scott Mainwaring and John Carey, "Juan Linz, Presidentialism and Democracy: A Critical Appraisal," *Comparative Politics* 29 (4): 449-472 (1999).

Lijphart, 116-142.

G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Divided Governance as a Pattern of Government," *Governance* 4: 231-235 (1991).

Morris Fiorina, "Coalition Governments, Divided Governments and Electoral Theory." *Governance* 4 (1991):236-49.

Further recommended reading:

Other articles in *Governance* 4 (1991) issue on divided government.

Samuel Kernell and Michael McDonald, "Congress and America's Political Development: The Transformation of the Post Office From Patronage to Service" *American Journal of Political Science* 43[3], 792-811. 1999.

David Mayhew, *Divided We Govern* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).

Mathew D. McCubbins, "The Legislative Design of Regulatory Structure." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (1985):721-48 (1985).

Adam Przeworski *et al.*, "What Makes Democracies Endure?" *Journal of Democracy* 1: 39-57 (1996).

Alfred Stepan and Cindy Skach, "Constitutional Frameworks and Democratic Consolidation: Parliamentarism and Presidentialism," *World Politics* 46:1-22 (1993).

J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances McCall Rosenbluth, *Japan's Political Marketplace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

PART III: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND SOCIETY

February 27: Parties and Working Class Formation

1. Does the Marxist account of working class formation stand up to empirical testing?
2. Why did worker's movements form stronger parties and movements in European countries like Germany and Britain than in the United States?
3. How did political institutions give shape and direction to different working class movements? How did these influences combine with differences in social and economic change?
4. What made the difference for the emergence of working class, democratic socialist parties?

Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg (eds.), *Working-Class Formation* (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-41, 397-455 (essays by Katznelson and Zolberg), and *two* of the following *three* excerpts: 45-154 (Sewell, Perrot and Cottureau on France), 159-276 (Bridges and Shefter on the United States), or 279-393 (Kocka and Nolan on Germany).

Victoria Hattam, "Institutions and Political Change: Working-class formation in England and the United States, 1820-1896," in Steinmo, Thelen and Longstreth, pp. 155-187.

Further recommended reading:

John Aldrich, *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Party Politics in America* (1995).

Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1960-1980: The Class Cleavage* (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2000).

Eric Foner, "Why is There No Socialism in the United States?" *History Workshop Journal* 17 : 57-80 (1984).

Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments : An Introduction", in Lipset S., Rokkan S. (dir.), *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*, New York, The Free Press, 1967), pp. 1-64.

Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, *It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States* (New York and London: WW Norton, 2000).

Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986).

March 6: Contemporary Party and Electoral Systems

1. What are the main variants in electoral systems, and what difference do these make for patterns of representation and governance?
2. What transformations have the working class parties of advanced industrial democracies recently undergone?

3. What parallel transformations have faced parties of the Right? What role has neoliberalism played in these transformations, and how have neoliberal agendas fared?
4. Have party elites, mass publics or institutions played the bigger role in these transformations?

Lijphart, pp. 62-89, 143-170.

G. Bingham Powell, "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1(2): 107-130 (1989).

Kitschelt, Herbert Lange Peter Stephens John D. Marks Gary. *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism*. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 293-396 (essays by Esping-Andersen, Kitschelt, van Kersbergen, and King/Wood).

Further recommended reading:

Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Geoffrey Garrett, *Partisan Politics in the Global Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Gerber, Elisabeth Jackson John E. 1993. "Endogenous Preferences and the Study of Institutions." *American Political Science Review* 87 (1993):639-56.

Herbert Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, *Japan's Political Marketplace*.

Kaare Strøm and Wolfgang Müller, *Policy, Office or Votes?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

March 11-16: SPRING RECESS

March 20: NO CLASS

March 27: Capitalism and the Welfare State

1. What constitutes the main types of "national capitalisms"? What holds these institutional systems together internally? What consequences do they have for politics, policy and performance?
2. What are the main international varieties of welfare states? What fundamental dynamics distinguish these types? Institutional, social, economic?
3. How far has the world economy globalized? In what sense?
4. Is economic globalization undermining distinctive national capitalisms and welfare states? If so, which ones and why? If not, why not?

Peter Hall and David Soskice, *Varieties of Capitalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), introduction (manuscript).

Kitschelt, Herbert Lange Peter Stephens John D. Marks Gary (eds.), *Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-69, 101-260, 427-460 (introduction, conclusion, and essays by McKeown, Simmons, Soskice, Hall, Stephens/Huber/Ray, Golden/Wallerstein/Lange, and Moene/Wallerstein).

Further recommended reading:

Maurice Albert, *Capitalism against Capitalism* (1993).

Ashford, Douglas. Structural Analysis and Institutional Change. *Polity* 19: 97-122 (1986).

Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (eds.), *National Diversity and Global Capitalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

Lars Calmfors and John Driffill, "Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Economic Performance," *Economic Policy* 6: 13-61 (1988).

Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

John Goldthorpe (ed.), *Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

Roger Hollingsworth and Robert C. Boyer (eds.), *Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett, "The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance, 1974-1980," *Journal of Politics* 47:792-82 (1985).

Paul Pierson, "The New Politics of the Welfare State," *World Politics* 48(1) (1996).

Paul Pierson, *Dismantling the Welfare State?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

PART IV: INSTITUTIONS AND SCALE

April 3: Federalism

Barry Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization* 11(1):1-31 (1995).

Jonathan Rodden and Susan Rose-Ackerman, "Does federalism preserve markets?"

Virginia Law Review 83 : 1521-1572 (1997).

Peterson, Paul E., *The Price of Federalism*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995).

APSA-CP: Newsletter of the Comparative Politics Section of the American Political Science Association, Special Issue on Federalism 11(1) (Winter 2000).

1. Does federalism promote the goals of economic, environmental, redistributive other policies better than other forms of territorial organization?
2. What problems does federalism have? In what circumstances is it a better or worse form of government?
3. What kind of analysis can best account for decisions for lodge more or less decisionmaking authority with the national government and with the states in the U.S.?
4. Does the rational choice account of fiscal federalism provide a convincing account of the

consequences from this form of government?

Further recommended reading:

- Jenna Bednar, John Ferejohn and William Eskridge, "A Political Theory of Federalism," in John Ferejohn, Jack Rakove and Riley (eds.), *Constitutions and Constitutionalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
- Daniel Kelemen, "Regulatory Federalism: EU Environmental Policy in Comparative Perspective," *Journal of Public Policy* 20: 2 (2000).
- Gabriela Montinola, Yingyi Qian and Barry Weingast, "Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China," *World Politics* 4:50-81 (1995).
- Wallace Oates, *Fiscal Federalism* (New York: Harcourt Brace, Jovanovich, 1972).
- William Riker, *Federalism: Origins, Operation, Significance* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
- Mark Carl Rom, Paul Peterson and Kenneth Scheve, "Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy," *Publius* 28(3): 17-38 (1998).
- Richard Revesz, "Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 'Race to the Bottom' Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation," *NYU Law Review* 67: 1210- (1992).
- Fritz Sharpf, "The Joint Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration," *Public Administration* 6 (1988).
- Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure, *Journal of Political Economy* 44(5): 416-424 (1956).

April 10: **Decentralization**

- Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grassroots* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 3-82, 217-266.
- Joel F. Handler, *Down from Bureaucracy: The Ambiguity of Privatization and Empowerment* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 1-111, 216-242.
- Jefferey M. Sellers, *Governing from Below* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Chapters 1, 3.

1. What critique does Selznick offer of decentralization in the New Deal? Why does he see decentralized governance as a problem? Does this critique hold up today?
2. Is Selznick more a new or an old institutionalist?
3. What are the sources of the ambiguity Handler finds in decentralization? Under what circumstances has decentralization raised the level of empowerment? How would Selznick respond to this analysis?
4. Why has decentralization taken place? Can institutional explanations account for this process, or are other influences (such as the changing economy) more powerful?

Further recommended reading:

Bob Jessop, "Narrating the Future of the National Economy and the National State: Remarks on Remapping Regulation and Reinventing Governance," in Steinmetz, pp. 378-401.

James Manor, *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization* (Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1999).

Gary Miller, *The Political Economy of Hierarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Peterson, *The Price of Federalism*.

Charles F. Sabel, "Flexible Specialization and the Re-emergence of Regional Economies", in: Paul Hirst and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds.), *Reversing Industrial Decline? Industrial Structure and Policy in Britain and Her Competitors* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989): 17-70.

Treisman, Daniel. (2000). Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action or Continuity? *American Political Science Review* 94: 837-858.

Oliver Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies* (New York: Free Press, 1975).

April 17: **Local Governance**

1. What can be gained by analyzing institutions from a local perspective?
2. What is local (or urban) governance, and what role does it play in overall systems of policy, politics and economics?
3. Can systems of local governance explain local outcomes any better than other typologies of governmental and politico-economic institutions?
4. Can institutional analysis provide a full account of the way democracy should operate?

Robert Dahl, "The City in the Future of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 61(4): 953-970 (1967).

Clarence Stone, *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta 1946-1988* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1990), pp. 179-233.

Sellers, Chapters 4-6.

Further recommended reading:

Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

David Judge, Gerry Stoker and Harold Wolman (eds.), *Theories of Urban Politics* (London: Sage Publications, 1995).

Mickey Lauria (ed.), *Reconstructing Urban Regime Theory* (London: Sage, 1997).

Paul Peterson, *City Limits* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

Clarence Stone, "Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach," *Journal of Urban Affairs* 15: 1-28 (1993).

April 24: **Presentation, discussion of student research proposals**

