

**THE NATION-STATE AND URBAN GOVERNANCE**

**Toward Multilevel Analysis**

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## **ABSTRACT**

In recent international comparative studies of urban governance, the nation-state has usually figured as a direct influence on local government and politics. This article, drawing on case studies of a similar U.S. and German city, demonstrates the need for a new, more sophisticated conception of the effects from national institutions. In the German city, a pro-business coalition carried out extensive social and environmental policies. In the U.S. city, a progressive coalition subordinated social and to a lesser degree environmental objectives to developmental aims. To account for these results I propose and apply a typology of national institutional contexts. These contexts influenced urban governance not only through direct effects on the choices of local elites and activists, but through indirect effects on translocal economies, urban economies and local culture.

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In the last decade, analyses of urban governance have grown increasingly international in scope. In the process, the analytical and empirical challenges of this cross-national comparative enterprise have become more and more evident. One of the most fundamental such challenges arises from the pervasive role of national institutional patterns, norms and policies as influences in urban governance. Several authors have mapped different patterns of national political and governmental institutions for urban governance (Pierre 1999; Goldsmith 1995; Page 1991). A growing number of studies have scrutinized how elements of nation-states operate alongside parallel economic influences upon cities (Kantor, Savitch & Vicari 1997; DiGaetano 1999). Yet so far, none of these studies have examined the full range of ways that the institutions linked to nation-states create the conditions of urban governance. Beyond the political and governmental factors that have preoccupied typologies of local government, the interlocal context, the economy and civil society need to be taken into account. In this article, drawing on “critical case studies” of a German and a U.S. urban regions (Eckstein 1975), I demonstrate how these influences from nation-states can be so decisive as to alter the aims of urban governing coalitions. Distinctive national institutional contexts have fostered social and environmentalist pursuits on the part of conservative, pro-business governing coalitions in Germany, and have limited not only the opportunities but the objectives of progressive, environmentalist coalitions in the United States. Comparative examination of the conditions for urban governance in each of these settings demonstrates how these institutional contexts can influence not only the local elites and activists involved in urban governance, but underlying urban economies and the preferences of ordinary citizens.

My account begins with a description of the policy outputs that urban governance helped bring about in the two cities over the late 1980s and early 1990s. I then outline the distinctive national systems of institutions that influenced urban governance, and analyze the variety of ways this influence took place.

### Policy Syntheses and Urban Coalitions

That wider institutional contexts matter for urban governance may already seem a familiar tenet of international comparative work. Yet in research that starts from comparisons of local actors, it remains all too easy to neglect the full extent of the difference these contexts make. As Tocqueville long ago observed, what is true in relation to one society may be false from a global perspective (Tocqueville 1969: 596-597; cf. Elster 1988, p. 83).

What appears along the political spectrum of the United States to be a “progressive coalition” around egalitarian and ecological objectives (Clavel 1986; cf. Clavel and Kleniewski 1990) may pursue an agenda that would be considered regressive in other countries. Similarly, what seems within the U.S. to be an inevitable relation between business support and the developmental preoccupation of a “growth coalition” or “growth machine” (Mollenkopf 1983; Logan & Molotch 1987) may prove conditional or even infrequent under the conditions of a different national political economy. The more closely comparison takes account of the actual agendas and coalitions that urban governance entails, and the more rigorous the common metrics of comparison, the more contradictions of this sort are likely to emerge.

To illustrate the problem, I examined the urban coalitions and the policies they pursued over the late 1980s and early 1990s in two mid-sized educational and administrative centers. Although similar in size, demographic makeup, economic structure and other respects, the two cities were located in the very different national contexts of western Germany and the United States. In each instance, rather than presume a necessary relation between a specific urban coalitions and a given urban agenda (cf. Stone 1993), my analysis started from a close comparison of the policies actually pursued in relation to indicators from an international sample of similar cities. These indicators encompassed the three overarching categories of economic and physical development, social equity, and environmental and other amenities. (Campbell, 1996; DiGaetano and Klemanski 1999). Following classification on the basis of “backward mapping” from local outputs from policy to the strategies undertaken within the two urban regions (Elmore, 1980), I compared these syntheses with the electoral and governing coalitions that formed around them.<sup>1</sup> In different ways for each society, the two examples posed critical tests of what governance within an urban region could accomplish. Considered in international perspective, each policy synthesis contradicted reigning assumptions about what urban coalitions pursue.

*Münster: Rightist pro-business coalition, comprehensive synthesis.* In the German city of Münster, international comparison of local outputs and local choices revealed some of the most systematic, effective policies toward both environmental quality and social equality. International comparisons have frequently highlighted general tendencies of this sort in German cities or even European cities as a group (e.g., Le Gales and Bascagno 1997; Nivola 1999; Jackson 1986). The striking aspects of these policies in Münster grew out of the urban coalition

that pursued them. Rather than the left-leaning progressive coalition that analysts in the U.S. and elsewhere in Western Europe have generally associated with environmental and social ends (cf. Clavel and Kleniewski; Le Galès 1993), the moderately conservative Christian Democratic Union had for nearly 50 years maintained the leading position in a long-lived governing coalition. Up to its ouster in 1994, the developmental policies of this coalition had also earned the city a reputation as one of the most “business-friendly” cities in the republic.<sup>2</sup> A comprehensive local policy synthesis thus combined significant measures in all three domains.

From 1984, the small business-oriented Free Democratic Party (FDP) had joined the CDU in this coalition. Yet throughout this period, the city continued to maintain and even enhance a tradition of urban environmental policy that stretched back to the nineteenth century. Assessed in terms of eight different types of environmental amenities in the central cities, Münster in the 1980s and 1990s ranked above three of four similar German cities as well as parallel French and U.S. cities (Sellers forthcoming, Table 2.1). Building on protections for green zones that traced back to city plan of 1920, and even older formal preservationist restrictions on development,<sup>3</sup> the city had integrated many of its environmental policies into a “Green Plan” instituted in 1966, and expanded in 1979. Six broad “Greenways (Grünzüge)” of protected open space radiated out from the Old Town like the spokes of a wheel. Between 1979 and 1993 the city lost only 2.4 percent of its agricultural land and .6 of its forestland. A proliferating system of parks, private gardens, and landscape restrictions anchored and helped reinforce this plan. At the same time, city officials cooperated in metropolitan planning arrangements to regulate sprawl beyond the city limits. New paths, bicycle racks and other encouragements helped generate one of the highest rates of bicycle ridership in the country. Environmentalist and preservationist policies toward the Old Town played an integral role in these initiatives. Urban renewal had taken a more preservationist form than even in many other German cities, and pedestrian zones had spread throughout the city since 1969. The city maintained a frequent bus service. By the early 1990s 30-kilometer speed limits applied throughout much of the residential area.

At the same time, the coalition maintained low levels of segregation and a strong emphasis on social policies. Comparative statistics left little doubt that local efforts had helped forestall the emergence of place-based disadvantages. In 1987 the dissimilarity index for foreigners remained just below 25, the index for unemployed residents at 11. These figures compared to averages of 39 and 45 for various categories of disadvantaged groups in comparable French and U.S. cities (Sellers 1999: 252). At the same time that the Social Democratic government of

North-Rhein Westphalia continued to make subsidies available for social housing, planners under the CDU-led local government required that this publicly sponsored housing be mixed with other, private forms of ownership. The more general thrust of local policy reflected a similar concern with social equity. Beyond the comparatively generous array of welfare benefits local officials administered for local residents under the German welfare state, local budgets also provided ample supplements to supralocal supports for working parents, children and the aged.<sup>4</sup> Despite critiques from the local Left opposition,<sup>5</sup> these local efforts come across in international perspective as a significant initiative on behalf of social and spatial equity.

Alongside these priorities, the CDU government in the city maintained a significant if increasingly less effective emphasis on economic and urban development. For much of this time local policies, overcoming both a low rate of national population increase and the decline of the adjacent Ruhr Valley, had contributed to a rate of growth for the urban region well above levels in the surrounding region or nationwide. From 1961 through 1987, the rate of population growth in the urban region as well as the city itself stood at two to three times that of the surrounding region or the country.<sup>6</sup> Following objectives institutionalized in the Comprehensive Plan of 1981, local officials promoted the growth of Münster as a regional service center (“Oberzentrum”).<sup>7</sup> In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the pro-business FDP joined the coalition, municipal initiatives aimed at new development proliferated. Local decisions expanded new commercial and industrial zones; redesigned new zones for the convention center and a new stadium; authorized expansion of shopping centers in outlying neighborhoods; initiated a new Technology Center, then a Technology Park; developed new housing in outlying neighborhoods; and sought to strengthen the urban center with more highways in the periphery and more parking in the downtown. Alongside these planning initiatives, one of the lowest business tax rates among German cities helped win Münster occasional recognition in the national business press.<sup>8</sup> Over this period, as population growth picked up slightly in the wider *Land* of North Rhein-Westphalia, expansion in the city continued at rates slightly higher than average.<sup>9</sup>

In the United States or even elsewhere in Western Europe, this emphasis on developmental policies would hardly have been surprising for a longtime business-friendly coalition aligned with the political Right. If any urban coalition in Germany were to oppose environmental and social policies linked to the anti-business Left, one would expect the one in Münster to do so. Yet the coalition in Münster had at the same time maintained environmental and social policies extensive enough to exceed those of Progressive coalitions elsewhere. When a Red-Green coalition

gained power in 1994, it ushered in surprisingly few alterations in these overall thrusts of local policy.<sup>10</sup>

*Madison: Progressive coalition, upscale synthesis.* Comparative observers of U.S. cities have often stressed the difficulty of pursuing objectives besides economic development and urban expansion (Keating 1991; Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989; DeLeon 1992). The example of the Progressive governing coalition in Madison, Wisconsin over the period from 1970 into the 1990s furnishes a critical test of the limits the U.S. context imposes. By comparison with elsewhere in the United States, local coalitions linked to the Left in educational and administrative centers like Madison have proven comparatively serious in their pursuit of environmental and social ends (Rosdill 1991; Clark and Goetz 1994; Clavel 1986). The city itself, as a moderately growing administrative and educational center with a comparatively monocentric urban region and a largely homogenous white population, resembled European cities like Münster more than did most U.S. counterparts. Location in an older manufacturing region added to these resemblances. In Madison, however, local policies emphasized development and environmental objectives over alleviating social and spatial polarization. In what might be termed an “upscale” synthesis for its attention to the interests of middle and upper-middle-class residents, even the pursuit of environmental objectives remained significantly less systematic than in German cities like Münster.

A national center of the early twentieth century Progressive Movement, Madison emerged again in the 1970s as the home of an urban Progressive coalition. Beginning in 1973, with the election of former University of Wisconsin activist Paul Soglin as mayor, this coalition emerged to dominate Madison politics for two and a half decades. The coalition fused support from growing suburban populations within the expanding city limits with large majorities among the students, poorer residents and urban professionals of the central and southern neighborhoods. Although a pro-development bloc persisted on the city council, a growing bloc on the Left furnished Soglin with crucial allies in his governing coalition. From 1979 to 1989 two other Democratic mayors, Joel Skornicka and Joseph Sensenbrenner, assembled much of the same business and suburban support around a stronger pro-development agenda. At the same time, both continued to cultivate ties with labor and many of the downtown civic and activist groups that had supported Soglin. In 1989 Soglin, with enhanced support from suburban neighborhoods added to his stronghold in the downtown, returned to win his first of four additional terms as mayor.

Despite the strong Progressive elements within these successive mayoral electoral coalitions, the local policy synthesis of the 1980s and 1990s retained a central focus on developmental policies. Similar to Münster,



Madison had earned rankings in national business periodicals like *Money* magazine as one of the best places in the country to do business. Especially when considered in terms of private as well as public activities, local developmental efforts generally outstripped equivalent measures in Münster and other equivalent European cities. Under the first Soglin administration in the 1970s, a new city plan and downtown revitalization laid the groundwork for expansion into the outlying areas. Over the 1980s and early 1990s, as annexations expanded the central city boundaries, the population of both the central city and the metropolitan area attained a modest rate of growth.<sup>11</sup> The later Soglin administration and its predecessors helped orchestrate regular expansion in the office capacity, service installations and physical limits of the city. Skornicka, citing “economic survival” in an era of federal and state budget cuts as the first priority of his administration,<sup>12</sup> had carried out plans for a Civic Center and introduced tax increment finance (TIF) districts to fund development in the downtown. Sensenbrenner maintained this reliance on devices like TIFs to fund new office, retail and housing, and pushed successive referenda to bring a new convention center to the city.<sup>13</sup> Despite arriving in office 1989 on a wave of opposition to a long-embattled convention center, the second Soglin administration ultimately carried out this and an array of other projects. A 1995 brochure prepared by local officials listed eight new corporate parks under construction, including large installations like the American Center, High Crossing, the World Agricultural Center and the Madison Corporate Center on the urban periphery.<sup>14</sup> Alongside further TIF funding, the city deployed new federal Community Development Block Grants and HOME assistance in support in an array of downtown redevelopment initiatives.<sup>15</sup>

Despite the participation of the local Left in electoral and governing coalitions, both local social policies and efforts to address disparities among neighborhoods remained far more limited than in Münster or other German cities. Even in 1970 economic and racial segregation had exceeded German levels. By 1990, as the urban region grew, polarization among neighborhoods accelerated dramatically. As the dissimilarity index for residents living in poverty climbed by 20 points to 50, the same index for African-Americans rose by six points to 59. Local official success at promoting growth, preserving a viable urban core, and providing neighborhood schools and environmental amenities helped bring housing values in the central area up to approximate the city average, but at the same time had helped send land and housing prices higher throughout the city.<sup>16</sup> Meanwhile poor areas designated for commercial rather than for residential uses in local land use regulation, like South Madison, remained pockets of disadvantage with prices up to 45 percent below the average. At the same time, social spending in

Madison remained low not only in comparison with Germany, but also in relation to comparable U.S. cities like Durham and New Haven. In 1992 the city itself devoted only 5.8 percent of its operating budget or \$35 per resident in social services, and still less for the poorest areas.<sup>17</sup> In the capital budget, \$1.95 million of the \$2.28 million for housing came from federal and state grants. Even the limited federal Community Development Block and HOME Program Grants the city applied toward neighborhood housing, business and social services concentrated more in and around the gentrifying downtown than in the most disadvantaged neighborhoods. Nor did the efforts of city officials to encourage use of federal Section 8 housing vouchers and construction of affordable housing outside local concentrations of poverty reverse the overall trend toward social and spatial polarization.<sup>18</sup> Despite attempts to integrate the elementary schools of South Madison in the mid-1980s, a majority of children in one school there still lived below the poverty level.<sup>19</sup> A succession of commissions and Task Forces highlighted the continued problems of the area, but ventured only minimal remedies.<sup>20</sup> For African Americans, racial discrimination in housing and other markets probably compounded socioeconomic disadvantages.<sup>21</sup>

By comparison with other U.S. cities, efforts to maintain high levels of environmental quality had always been a hallmark of urban governance in Madison.<sup>22</sup> The Progressive coalitions of the 1980s and 1990s renewed this emphasis. Reinforced with the support of a stronger nucleus of professional and other residents than in most U.S. downtowns, the Soglin, Skornicka and Sensenbrenner administrations contributed to the elaboration of historical preservation, design restrictions and neighborhood amenities in the central area.<sup>23</sup> Coordination with transportation and land use policies had helped enable the city to maintain an economically viable pedestrian zone along State Street of a sort rarely seen in U.S. cities. The local government owned and helped support the Madison Metro bus company, and built a growing network of bicycle paths. New additions enhanced a system of parks and nature reserves to a system built up from the turn of the century. City officials also developed an unusually elaborate system of plans and controls that helped limit sprawl and the disappearance of farmland, forests and open space. Neighborhood planning, impact fees, and negotiations with developers helped reinforced these policies. Drawing on county-wide plans and an urban growth boundary that dated back to the beginning of the 1970s, city officials employed annexation powers and refusals to provide municipal services alongside local planning and zoning authorities to assert control of peripheral urban development.

Despite these efforts, most international indicators of environmental policy outputs in Madison continued

to fall short of German levels. From 1980 to 1990 agricultural and undeveloped land shrank by 6.6 percent of the municipal total. Use of bicycles and mass transit persisted at levels far below those in comparable German cities, and pedestrian zones and historic preservation remained more limited.<sup>24</sup> Comparative analysis thus highlights not only the emphasis of Progressive coalitions in U.S. cities like Madison on interests of middle class and privileged residents over those of poor, working class and minority citizens (cf, Stone 1993), but even the limitations of these coalitions in securing environmental public goods. In both domains, the outputs under the Progressive coalition in Madison fell short of those under the conservative, pro-business coalition of Münster. Only in developmental policies that the coalition in Münster also stressed did the Progressive coalition of Madison succeed more.

Both policy syntheses contradict one would conclude from the relative position of each coalition in its national context . In the German city a conservative, pro-business coalition synthesized strong environmental and social measures with efforts to promote growth. In the United States city a progressive coalition pursued progressive aims of social equity in a limited, even self-defeating fashion, and encountered comparatively limited environmental success alongside urban growth. Clearly national policies, norms and institutions need to be taken into account to explain these contradictions. But in each instance the urban governing coalitions themselves have contributed to local agendas, choices and ultimately outcomes. One of the most important challenges for cross-national urban comparisons lies in sorting out the relation between these influences.

#### National Infrastructures of Urban Governance

Established typologies of local government systems have long highlighted important differences that national institutions can make for urban governance (Page and Goldsmith 1987; Page 1991; Hesse 1991). By definition, however, this governance takes place in the economy, in civil society, and in relations among localities as well as in the local political process and through relations with supralocal governments. A sufficiently broad account of the infrastructure for this governance must address how the institutions of nation-states also influence these other domains.

Part of these institutions can be classified under familiar categories of local government and intergovernmental relations. Wider systems of interest aggregation, representation and political parties at the national level set many of the terms for local decision-making and policy. At the same time, the divergent patterns

of capitalist institutions that distinguish different advanced industrial societies play a crucial role. Distinctive systems of corporate governance, industrial relations, education and training systems and inter-firm relations confront the protagonists of urban governance with different economic conditions as well as different sets of policies (Hall and Soskice 2000). Different types of welfare states compound these contrasts with characteristic patterns of housing, pension and insurance programs (Esping-Anderson 1990). As research on fiscal federalism shows, territorial structures of local and supralocal government often mediate the way that economic systems as well as supralocal governments and policies affect cities (Ter-Minasian 1997). Translocal systems of organized interests, government and political parties may manifest themselves as decisively at the local level for urban governance as at the heights of the state. Infrastructures for cooperation among localities can enable or disable the metropolitan dimension of urban governance.

Amidst the diversity of these institutional domains, this national infrastructure of local governance often follows an overarching logic (Table 2). In an *organized* infrastructure like that generally attributed to Germany and northern Europe, formal organizations dominate the economy and society. Lawmakers and norms issued at the heights of the state set the broad lines of policy. Strong, centralized parties as well as highly organized economic interests help enable this pattern. Although administration operates in a decentralized manner to carry out this policy, a national system of localized, civil service bureaucracy helps assure consistent local approaches. Fiscal equalization reinforces these tendencies with equal local financial obligations. The standardization inherent in this system helps equalize disparities in policy among places, and gives potentially mobile firms and workers less incentive to search for more favorable local contexts. Just as the state depends on these elements of formal organization, the capitalist order of this “coordinated market economy” (Hall and Soskice) relies on organization and institutionalized cooperation. The encompassing, hierarchically organized business and labor interests of corporatism shape national economic decisions. Industrial relations, worker training, corporate organization, and relations among businesses order the operation markets through collective institutions and cooperation among them. Entrenched in national policies, a “corporatist welfare regime” (Esping-Andersen 1990; Goodin *et al.* 1999) provides a far-reaching system of welfare benefits tied to the status of professions and economic groups.

By contrast, the *market-centered* infrastructure of the United States builds upon institutions that require and foster private ordering through markets (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich 1989). In the governmental and administrative

sphere, as well as among political parties and interest groups, supralocal institutions here present a much more decentralized and fragmented pattern. Especially since the 1960s, policies to intervene from state and especially from federal levels of government have remained limited. No uniform system of bureaucracy or political organization exists to impose consistent processes of local administration. Within cities as well, as U.S. regime theorists have argued (e.g., Stone 1993), fragmented, decentralized local governments and political organization hamper coordination. Shaped by rules that discourage the formation of stable political parties, policymaking and politics also rely on institutional infrastructures that often resemble the open-structured, flexible and volatile structures of the marketplace. Decentralized fiscal infrastructures for local government make local revenues dependent on local tax bases. As a result, urban leaders have often looked to businesses within cities and markets among urban places for the means as well as the ends of governance. The broader dependence of the U.S. “liberal market economy” (Hall and Soskice) on markets to order production and innovation reinforces and builds on these tendencies. In the place of coordinated market institutions, shareholder value, fluid labor markets, general educational credentials and contractual relations among firms predominate. The “liberal welfare regime” (Goodwin, *et al.* 1999) supplements this economic order with limited welfare benefits targeted to the neediest groups.

The strong complementarities between political and economic logics in the infrastructure of each country suggest that each set of institutions reinforces each other. Whatever the nature of this reinforcement, the two infrastructures clearly confront urban governance with radically divergent contexts. These conditions account for much of the seeming paradox in the policy syntheses and urban coalitions of Madison and Münster.

#### Consequences of National Infrastructures

For analysis of urban governance, the crucial task lies in tracing how these wider infrastructures shape the possibilities and consequences of activities within urban regions. How, for instance, might the Organized infrastructure of Münster foster extensive social policies and assertive environmental measures even on the part of local coalitions mobilized around business interests? How can the Market-Centered infrastructure of Madison has reinforced limits on policies toward social equity and environmental quality even for a progressive coalition? Even for these two generally comparable cities, the problem demands a more complex analysis than simply a comparison of relations between each local government and governments at higher levels, or even comparison of local

government institutions. In each instance, the infrastructure also shapes elite decision-making in the economy and society, relations with other localities, and the preferences of ordinary people in markets and voting.

We can separate out this array of influences along two analytic dimensions (Table 3). On the one hand, an infrastructure may impose not only *specific* or effects on the conditions that elites and activists directly involved in governance face, but *diffuse* or indirect effects through influences on the preferences of political constituencies, consumers and firms. On the other, both specific and diffuse effects can take place within the confines of an urban political economy, or through influences from translocal markets, networks and other processes. Not only the interlocal markets for local revenues and provision of local services that the Tiebout model has highlighted (1956; cf. Peterson 1981), but translocal movement organizations, political parties, organized interests, professional planning networks and media of communication can shape an urban political economy from outside.

As comparative studies of national “systems” of local government have stressed, local governmental structures, financial rules, party systems, organized interests and administrative apparatuses impose “rules of the game” from above on coalitions (Page; Goldsmith). Comparative analysis of urban governance under coordinated and liberal market economies also highlights how practices linked to these different forms of capitalism can influence choices within urban settings. If we take the wider metropolitan area rather than a central city jurisdiction to be the local setting, then supralocal rules, incentives and procedures as well as elite and organizational networks for metropolitan planning fall within this category.

Beyond these strictly internal influences, specific external effects derived from supralocal governments have often proven the easiest to compare. Mandates and other requirements impose constraints from above. Supralocal policy initiatives or responses from above can deliver political resources for local officials. Authorizations, grants and other financial and legal mechanisms set conditions for local initiatives. Supralocal governments may provide for varying degrees and types of fiscal redistribution among localities. A more extensive welfare state usually entails greater supralocal participation in such domains as housing and local social services. At the same time, analysis of urban governance must pay attention to the operation of translocal market relations and organizational networks. Especially in the context of a uniform local civil service bureaucracy, high degrees of political organization, and a coordinated market economy, even nongovernmental elites may make local choices with an eye to the norms or organizational ties of the wider translocal setting. Increasingly, infrastructures for

regional and metropolitan governance have also imposed horizontal systems of ordering.

At least as important for urban governance, but less prominent in the comparative urban literature, are the diffuse effects from national infrastructures on households, market clienteles and even those firms that cannot be considered part of local elites. In the households, markets and civil society of an urban region, individuals and firms base their behaviors on tax incentives, on property rights, and on such direct interventions of national governments as welfare state benefits. Different economic infrastructures may also foster distinct orientations among voters and workers. As ordinary people and local firms define and pursue their aims through markets, voting and social movements, these influences from above feed back into urban governance. From the perspective of the local elites involved in urban governance, such influences often manifest themselves in ways indistinguishable from other local or national cultural preferences. The translocal media and organizational networks that communicate cultural preferences within a society often reinforce these preferences at wider scales. At the same time, as the Tiebout model highlights, markets among places offer households and firms opportunities to affect local elites through the threat of exit. Infrastructures that encourage divergences among local tax incentives, local regulation, and locally provided public goods enhance this indirect, external influence on local governance.

Despite these pervasive influences from national infrastructures, urban governance still relies on local agency. But the degree of this “local autonomy” often depends on the ends the elites most closely involved in urban governance are trying to achieve, and on the agency of mass publics and market clienteles as well as those elites. Faced with a complex array of influences that are often difficult to trace or assign relative weights, it has been all too easy for comparative analysts of urban governance to neglect the full impact of supralocal infrastructures on local trajectories. In addition, even in the remarkably similar cases of Münster and Madison, comparative resemblances in the social, economic and spatial makeup of the two urban regions cannot hold all other conditions for urban governance constant. Comparative analysis of the institutional context and its effects in each city nonetheless yields numerous reasons for the disjuncture between local policies and local coalitions.

*Germany: Effects of the Organized Infrastructure.* Analysis of the context in Münster illustrates the numerous ways that an Organized infrastructure can promote environmental and social objectives. For decades, the conservative, business-oriented coalition that controlled the city government had faced external, internal and cultural

influences of this sort.

In matters of social policy, and increasingly in the environmental domain, centralized policies imposed resources and constraints from above. Since 1960, national and Land-level rules articulated an increasingly stringent framework for local environmental regulation and planning. Successive restrictions imposed legal standards that limited development outside urban centers, the size of supermarkets outside urbanized areas, and aggregate losses of forestland within municipalities. Social welfare policies also imposed a comparatively uniform level of benefits that local governments themselves administered. In housing, one of the most crucial domains for place-based disadvantages, the Left government of North Rhein-Westphalia had enhanced subsidies provided across the country for publicly sponsored, socially integrated housing. As late as 1987, as the national CDU-FDP government cut back these subsidies, the 22 percent of housing units subsidized by public means compared favorably with proportions in other German cities with Left and mixed governments.<sup>25</sup> The system of public finance for the city ensured ample means for implementing provisions handed down from above. All but 23% percent of city revenues came either from supralocal sources or from taxes that the local government collected under a nationally regulated system.<sup>26</sup> Local developmental policies also followed and had to respect priorities handed down from above. Regional planning, by favoring infrastructure development in the nearby, heavily Social Democratic and industrialized Ruhr Valley over expansion in Münster, had left city officials with fewer resources to pursue development to the detriment of environmental and social aims.

Within the city itself, the growth of local environmental policy not only represented a response to the rise of local environmentalist movements and a strong local Green party, but a result of longstanding conditions. Elements rooted in wider infrastructures limited the influence of business and development interests to supplant environmental and social objectives in favor of growth (cf. Molotch 1993; Strom 1997). A strong, sizeable local bureaucracy staffed through the national civil service looked to norms in supralocal legislation, and enabled the local government to carry out policy initiatives with less reliance on civil society.<sup>27</sup> The unified local administrative structure under the Local Council and the mayor and department heads further insulated the government from outside influences. Exclusion of education and policing from the scope of local governmental authority further restricted the potential for institutional fragmentation. A governing party with strong local organizations in the community also reduced the need to rely on the Chamber of Commerce and Industry and other business



organizations for governance. Although more closely identified with the interests of local business in expansion than the local Left parties, the local CDU traced its organizational and civic roots at least as much to local religious associations. As elsewhere in Germany, local CDU tradition in Münster embraced preservation of traditional urban forms and Christian solidarity with the disadvantaged.<sup>28</sup>

Within the local political economy, city-owned firms offered local officials an array of instruments for control of development on behalf of social and environmental ends. Municipal companies played an active if not a dominant role in development, housing, electric, gas, transit, water, sewer, waste management and even development finance (through a local savings and loan). An even more far-reaching influence stemmed from the wider institutional infrastructure of the coordinated market economy. In the same way that the stronger national party system manifested its influence at the local level, corporatist forms of interest organization might have been expected to preserve a more prominent place in local policy for organized representatives of business and labor. Yet as Strom found in reunified Berlin (1997), the Chamber of Commerce and other local business associations played comparatively little role in urban governance. Both highly formalized channels of representation in local policymaking and the hierarchical organization of business and labor limited the influence of the Chamber and the local unions. Both groups participated to a limited degree in advocacy of developmental policies. The regional office of the Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund participated actively alongside business in campaigns to expand local and regional infrastructure and build projects like a new stadium. It had undertaken far less on behalf of competing environmental and social concerns outside the workplace. Indeed, local planners in the mid-1990s could not recall instances when unions had intervened in these other areas. In accordance with the logic of a coordinated market economy, regional business and labor organizations worked primarily to coordinate training and economic development initiatives independent from municipal intervention. German arrangements for worker participation in corporate governance may nonetheless have created greater acceptance within local businesses themselves for social and perhaps environmental aims. In Münster, businesses either supported or did little to stand in the way of both socially integrated housing and much of local preservationist policies.

To stop at these direct and internal effects on governance within Münster would neglect how supralocal governments and translocal organization also shaped the horizontal relations of local elites with counterparts in other cities. In the immediate periurban area beyond the city limits, these influences facilitated metropolitan governance

of development. Since the 1960s, metropolitan planning frameworks established by the federal government and the Land had coordinated efforts among city officials to limit loss of forests and farmland in the outlying areas with similar efforts beyond the city limits. As administered in North Rhein-Westphalia after the 1960s, the national system of regional planning also placed constraints on how much other urban regions could draw housing and industry from Münster. At the same time, reinforced through the subsidies in North Rhein-Westphalia, the standardized German system of local finance limited the incentives for municipalities to compete among each other to expand local tax bases. Beyond government and the networks of the civil service bureaucracy, national systems of political parties and organized interests diffused norms that helped reinforce priorities like those in Münster. Over the 1980s, for instance, the Greens had grown rapidly into a significant local advocate of environmental initiatives in university towns across Germany (Sellers 1998).

Finally, beyond any direct effects on urban elites, the infrastructure influenced the preferences of firms, consumers and voters within the city. Not only the apparent political consensus that undergirded local ecological policies, but the patterns of local land use values suggested strong support for policies to forestall urban sprawl and maintain the urban center. In the mid-1990s, prices for land authorized for urban development in the historic city center ranged two to eight times as high as in the outlying and periurban areas (Münster 1995). Preferences of this sort constitute far more than simply local culture. They can only be fully understood in light of taxes that raised the price of gasoline, and therefore automobile usage, by 56 percent (OECD 1999: 243); housing subsidies that offered relatively modest incentives for single-family as opposed to rental homes (Marcuse 1982); and a host of other provisions anchored at supralocal levels (Pucher & Lefevre 1996; Nivola 1999). In encouraging preferences for more centralized settlement, many of these same conditions also fostered support for more integrated residential patterns. Other elements of the organized infrastructure worked in favor of equality of opportunity in housing markets. The coordinated market economy limited wage disparities (Streeck 1995). The comparatively generous corporatist welfare state assured both lower levels of income inequality and greater security against losses in income (Goodin *et al.*, pp. 173-186, 197-210). With less dispersed, more stable incomes, and more subsidized rental housing, fewer housing consumers were likely to demand either the low prices of a ghetto or the elevated prices of an exclusive enclave (cf. Clark & Dieleman 1996: 207). Beyond the city, the same standardization of finances and local policies that imposed direct limits on the city government also diminished the incentives for mobile firms and

households to shop for lower tax rates or better services. Reinforced through a national news media, highly articulated networks of political parties, interest groups, movement organizations and planning professionals helped diffuse local norms from around the country.

It goes beyond the scope of this article to assess how much any one of these influences contributed to the result. All told, however, this analysis points to numerous reasons why a conservative, business-oriented governing coalition in Germany might stress social and environmental aims that studies in the United States and even other Western European countries have usually found more prominent among progressive coalitions. Influences from the infrastructure of urban governance came not only from the top down but through horizontal effects and from the bottom up.

*United States: Consequences from a Market-centered infrastructure.* A corresponding set of influences accompanied the converse fate of the Progressive coalition in Madison. It would be difficult to understand why this coalition produced the result that it did without looking to the infrastructure of supralocal norms and institutions that U.S. urban coalitions face.

Here the constraints lay largely in the absence of mandates and other authorities to do more to address the issues. American constitutional property rights long furnished a basis for challenges to any regulation at local or supralocal levels that pursue those ends (Blaesser & Weinstein 1989). At the same time, the United States lacked the national or even state-level legislative mandates of Organized systems like Germany to regulate and control land use for environmental or social ends. Especially since the 1960s, national and state-level governmental programs provided only limited, dwindling financial and other supports for efforts of local elites and activists to address disparities among neighborhoods and groups. With low social expenditures, and only 2.1 percent of local housing stock subject to support from supralocal subsidies, local welfare state administration offered few organizational means for local social initiatives. Since fully 62 percent of municipal revenues in Madison derived from locally controlled taxation, the city also received a much smaller portion of its income from supralocal or redistributed governmental sources than under Organized or Government-Centered infrastructures. Beyond the limited support from above for an emphasis on distributive equity, this infrastructure necessitated that initiatives in environmental or social domains originate within the city.

There, local practices anchored in the wider infrastructure of urban governance reinforced a fragmented patchwork of organizations and policies that depended on the local economy and society. Nonpartisan elections limited the impact of parties, and the local Chamber of Commerce served only a limited role in organizing representation of local economic interests. The local bureaucracy remained much smaller than its German counterpart, and less integrated into a single hierarchy.<sup>29</sup> Municipal control over infrastructure and other companies remained subject to local choices. Usually instituted under procedural frameworks embedded in state law, an array of specialized citizen commissions assumed much of the responsibility for decisions. Even the master plan for the city effectively depended on a wider array of more specific procedures for peripheral development, parks and open space, urban design, and zoning. Functions of local government not handled at the local level in Germany, like policing and public education, compounded the organizational fragmentation. Formal procedures in state statutes also institutionalized dependence of governance on activity in the community. Biennial elections, frequent referenda, public hearings, participatory procedures, and appointed or elected commissions opened official decision\_making about local issues at numerous points to more influence from local publics and veto groups.<sup>30</sup>

The combination left local choices and their implementation, and ultimately the local policy synthesis itself, subject to what amounted to a political marketplace. As U.S. theorists of urban regimes have emphasized in many other U.S. contexts (e.g., Stone 1989; DeLeon 1992), Soglin and his mayoral counterparts relied on negotiation with developers and firms interested in new projects to carry out policies toward local land use and development. Governing coalitions had drawn on the municipal sewage, water, power and bus companies the government controlled to enforce peripheral restrictions on growth and equity in service delivery. But the city also lacked the municipal housing, development, and financial firms available to officials in Freiburg. Neighborhood\_based organizations with greater commitment and resources, who generally represented the middle-class and well-to-do neighborhoods of the city, had extensive opportunities to shape local choices. With the support of an unusually mobilized local civic community, these associations had allied with movement organizations like the Sierra Club and the League of Women Voters to furnish much of the impetus behind local environmental policy. Distressed neighborhoods like those of South Madison, lacking similar capacities, faced compounded disadvantages in this political marketplace.<sup>31</sup> Neighborhood mobilization on behalf of social measures addressed to these settings remained weak.

Authorized, though not mandated, in state enactments, regional planning in the surrounding Dane County as well as the city had succeeded more than in most U.S. urban regions in restricting urban sprawl. Yet external pressures at least partly related to the infrastructures of governance at state and national levels limited both this success and efforts to alleviate social inequities. Endowed with the “place luck” of an attractive natural setting, a prominent position in regional markets and the assets of the University of Wisconsin and the state capitol, Madison stood in a position to gain more than most U.S. urban centers from competition with other localities for residents and businesses. The comparative dependency of local revenues on local property taxes made every new business that arrived more of a boon to local coffers. Affluent employees conferred the greatest financial benefits, and the environmental amenities as well as the educational policies of the city had largely succeeded in attracting this group. At the same time, in bearing a high burden of the financing for any local initiative, local officials faced disincentives to extend local initiatives beyond benefits to this group. As a result, not only local efforts to reduce local social and spatial disparities, but local environmental measures had remained limited by comparison with German counterparts. Even Paul Soglin relied in the 1990s on ‘fiscal populism’ (Clark and Ferguson 1983). In promising to reduce local property taxes (*Capital Times*, April 3, 1991, p. 4A; *Wisconsin State Journal*, April 5, 1995, p. 7A), he had reaffirmed that benefits from his administration would go mainly to local middle and upper middle class residents. Translocal organizational and professional networks also furnished fewer reinforcements to environmental and social measures than the established parties, the Greens, the organized interests and the planners in Münster. These influences and the media linked to them not only lacked the organizational capacities of their counterparts in Germany, but typically espoused economic development as the overriding aim of local policy (e.g., Molotch 1993).

As Keith Hoggart and Terry Clark have found more generally among U.S. cities (2000, pp. 4-8), the prominence of local participation made support in the community all the more important to local governance. On the one hand, the bulk of residents repeatedly ratified the dispersed, segregated settlement patterns with electoral support for Soglin and his policies. On the other hand, the same households reaffirmed these strategies with choices in local markets for housing. Even the development and business interests that set the terms of supply in these markets could not escape the need to cater to anticipated demand. As housing values throughout most of the city rose, the rapid increases in the segregated, outlying neighborhoods of the West Side manifested the strength of

preferences to live there. Valuations in the exclusive Highlands neighborhood, for instance, went from 2.8 times the city average in 1983 to 3.4 times in 1995; along the western shores of Lake Monona, prices went from 1.8 to 2.3 times the city average. As a result, even prices in the gentrifying areas of the downtown had only recovered during this period to valuation levels around the city average, and even the rising valuations of the poorest neighborhoods remained just as low as before in relation to this average.

As in Münster, incentives embedded in national and state-level infrastructures were partly responsible for these individual preferences. If market choices reflected local or national culture, institutionalized incentives helped to define and perpetuate that culture (Pucher & Lefevre 1996; Nivola 1999; Jackson 1986). Tax subsidies like the mortgage interest deduction rewarded ownership of single family homes (Marcuse). Fuel taxes lower than anywhere else in the OECD, combined with road-building and other transportation policies, encouraged use of automobiles over transit, bicycles or walking.<sup>32</sup> Educational policies that provided schools by neighborhoods encouraged the spread of settlement outwards. Direct and indirect housing subsidies furnished little of the support provided rental housing in German downtowns (Marcuse 1982). Conditions like these gave the peripheral residential constituencies that increasingly dominated Madison politics less reason to support the municipal spending and taxation that might have redressed the growing imbalances among neighborhoods and social groups, or enabled more effective environmental measures. More generally, the limits that the liberal welfare state of the United States placed on public assistance afforded poor residents less opportunity than in Germany to secure sufficient or stable income to move into mixed neighborhoods (Clark & Diele). In the “Wisconsin Works” program of 1992, a reform that would emerge as a precedent for national policy, the state of Wisconsin reinforced these disadvantages with a two-year time limit on welfare benefits (DeParle 1999). Outside the city, the disparities in taxes and services among U.S. municipalities contributed to the comparative willingness of firms and professionals to move to Madison. Even as local leaders emphasized the distinctiveness of the city, the political and economic culture there partly reflected the influx of ideas about local policy from the surrounding region and the country at large.

Through alterations to the political and market orientations of local residents as well as the opportunities local leaders faced, the market-centered infrastructure shaped not just the opportunities but the aims of the Progressive coalition in Madison. Even leaders like Soglin, who began his political career as an unambiguous

Leftist, ultimately subordinated social and to some degree environmental ends to the aim of development. As a result, only a modest environmentalism and a few minor initiatives on behalf of disadvantaged groups modified what a rightist pro-business coalition might have done.

#### Conclusion: The Implications From Multilevel Analysis

For all the recent talk of globalization and other transnational trends in comparative studies of urban politics, the consequences of nation-states themselves for urban governance remain only partly understood. In particular, infrastructures of urban governance can influence the choices of urban coalitions so pervasively as to alter the basic aims that urban governance pursues. In Germany, even conservative business-oriented regimes have pursued comprehensive policy syntheses much like those ascribed to Progressive coalitions elsewhere. In the U.S., even Progressive coalitions have turned to syntheses that qualify as upscale by international standards. Neither broad distinctions between a “European city” and an “American city” (Bascagno and LeGales, 1997), nor notions of urban cultures (Fainstein and Fainstein 1982) can fully capture the precise role that nation-states play in these local outcomes. Even if it is local culture and geography that decisively shaped the ultimate trajectories of local policy, there can be little doubt that what I have described as infrastructures of urban governance contributed to these other influences. A full understanding of these influences will require new, more sophisticated analytic approaches to urban governance.

The two largely similar cases I have examined illustrate both the avenues by which national infrastructures can influence urban governance, and the degree to which this influence can alter the goals as well as the accomplishments of urban governance (Table 3). At the same time, the examples of Münster and Madison highlight how effects from institutional infrastructures depend to one degree or another on the uses urban elites and activists make of institutions imposed from above.

In the German case, the constraints the infrastructure imposed, the capacities it gave local officials and the trajectories of local politics it fostered worked in favor of both environmental and social elements in local syntheses. My analysis of urban governance in Münster suggests several ways that the Organized infrastructure there fostered this synthesis under even a pro-business, Rightist electoral coalition. Supralocal institutions imposed policies, procedures, fiscal resources, institutional frameworks and organizational identities that fostered environmental and

social measures. Although local elites in Münster had also worked to elaborate developmental strategies, these arrangements placed limits on the potential to cumulate either market or fiscal benefits from doing so. Parallel influences were at work in the translocal economy and local society. As aspects of the infrastructure ensured interlocal cooperation and limited the effects of translocal markets, other elements fostered greater support in local mass publics and among consumers for local social and environmental policies. The Organized infrastructure left local choices less dependent on governance within the city. At the same time that constraints and resources from above limited how much local policies could vary, standardized organizations and interests fostered more parallel local trajectories

In most larger U.S. cities Progressive coalitions have failed to maintain electoral power (DeLeon 1992). Even when they do, power comes at the cost of an altered governing agenda. Analysis of urban governance in Madison over the 1980s and early 1990s points to several ways that the market-centered infrastructure discourages social aims and makes pursuit of environmental goods comparatively difficult. Here decentralization, localized finance, institutional fragmentation and participatory procedures posed impediments to the development of effective local strategies in pursuit of these ends. In fostering interlocal markets, this infrastructure encouraged interlocal competition for affluent workers and firms. In promoting segregated, dispersed forms of settlement and the accompanying exclusionary politics, it promoted comparative neglect of social justice and only limited pursuit of environmental public goods. For better as well as for worse, this infrastructure left ultimate policy choices more exclusively to urban governance itself. Madison had seized on the opportunities inherent in this system to construct an unusually extensive array of local environmental measures for an American city. In the economic domain, initiatives also came partly from the community itself. In the social domain this infrastructure imposed constraints on both local institutional capacities and support in the community.

Alongside analysis of emerging transnational urban trends,<sup>33</sup> the future of international comparative urban studies lies at least as much in deepening our understanding of differences like these. Even international developments common to many cities, such as globalization, nest at the same time within nation-states, within regions and within cities. The more rigorous international comparison of urban governance becomes, the more comparativists must develop analytical approaches adequate to the complexity of these wider institutional contexts.<sup>34</sup> Precisely because nested governance often extends beyond local government, the multilevel analysis it



demands must reach beyond intergovernmental relations. Analytically distinct lines of causation link urban governance to nation-states through interlocal relations, the economy and civil society as well as governmental hierarchies. As the paired comparison of this article shows, these influences can be crucial not only to the outputs but to the aims of urban coalition-building and policy. To sort out these influences and their significance will ultimately require closer attention to how urban governance varies both within and between countries.

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Table 1

**Infrastructures of Urban Governance and Their Logics**

	<b>Organized (Germany)</b>	<b>Market-centered (U.S.)</b>
<b>Logic</b>	Collective ordering	Market ordering
<b>Policy</b>	Centralized	Decentralized
<b>Implementation, administration</b>	Decentralized, standardized	Decentralized, varied
<b>Politics</b>	Strong, centralized parties	Individualized political markets
<b>Interest groups</b>	Corporatist organization	Pluralist organization
<b>Market economy</b>	Coordinated	Liberal
<b>Welfare state</b>	Corporatist	Liberal

Table 2

### Effects from National Infrastructures on Urban Governance

	<b>Specific effects</b> (on elites, decision-making processes)	<b>Diffuse effects</b> (on firms, households)
<b>Internal to urban political economy</b>	Local government systems Party systems Systems of interest representation and participation Fiscal rules Procedures and authorizations Systems of metropolitan governance	Tax incentives Regulatory constraints Welfare state incentives Other direct supralocal interventions Wage and firm structures
<b>External relations of urban political economy</b>	Intergovernmental relations (vertical and horizontal) Systems of fiscal redistribution Relations of local parties, interest groups with translocal organizations Multilocational firms	Comparative direct interventions Comparative tax incentives Comparative regulatory constraints Translocal markets Translocal production and distribution networks Translocal cultural reinforcements (media, social movements, other contacts)

Table 3

### Consequences of National Infrastructures for Urban Governance

	<b>Organized</b>	<b>Market-centered</b>
<b>Aims in local syntheses:</b>		
<b>Development</b>	Encouraged but limited	Encouraged
<b>Environmental goods</b>	Encouraged	Limited
<b>Social equity</b>	Encouraged	Discouraged
<b>Dependence of local policy syntheses on urban governance</b>	Low	High

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<sup>1</sup> Mollenkopf 1992: 5.

<sup>2</sup> In 1989 the business magazine *Wirtschaftswoche* rated the city the best place to do business in the country.

<sup>3</sup> Heinberg & Mayr 1987, p. 296; City of Münster 1991, p. 16.

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<sup>4</sup> A model program of subsidies for self-help groups in diverse social spheres had earned the city the accolade of CDU Labor Minister Blüm as the “self-help-friendliest city in the Republic.” (*Wirtschaftsreport Münster* 1988/1989, p. 8).

<sup>5</sup> The housing policies of the Right during the 1990s had emphasized privately owned dwellings more and social or rental housing less than the Red-Green coalition would. At the same time the CDU and FDP came under fire for refusing to commit more resources to house and otherwise assist the growing but comparatively small numbers of local asylum seekers and other immigrants in the city. Debates over local budget priorities in the years leading up to the 1994 election exemplify these critiques (*Stellungnahme der Ratsfraktionen* 1991, 1992, 1993).

<sup>6</sup> Over this period the population increased at .04 percent per year in the city and at .08 percent per year in the metropolitan area, compared with .02 percent in the Land of North Rhein-Westphalia and .03 percent nationwide.

<sup>7</sup> Münster 1983.

<sup>8</sup> Kamphuls 1989: 57, 58.

<sup>9</sup> The city’s growth rate of .09 per year between 1987 and 1994 was virtually matched by the Land rate.

<sup>10</sup> In 1999, the Red-Green coalition was to lose, and the CDU return to power.

<sup>11</sup> Between 1980 and 1990 the population growth of 1.2 percent per year in the city and 1.4 percent per year in the metropolitan area persisted at well about the rate of .6 percent per year in Wisconsin and even the U.S. rate of 1.0 percent per year (U.S. Census figures). Over the 1990s growth continued at slightly lower rates that continued to exceed state and national averages (1.2 percent per year in the city (1990-1999) and metropolitan area (1990-1997), compared with .8 percent per year in Wisconsin (1990-1999)) (U.S. Census estimates, at [www.census.gov](http://www.census.gov) (February 1, 2001)).

<sup>12</sup> *Capital Times* (April 8, 1981), p. 39.

<sup>13</sup> *Capital Times* (April 1, 1989), p. 21.

<sup>14</sup> (Wisconsin Community Development Institute 1995).

<sup>15</sup> A 1995 summary prepared by local officials listed eight such projects (Wisconsin Community Development Institute 1995).

<sup>16</sup> From 1983 to 1995, according to municipal tax assessments, the average price of a single-family house climbed 24 percent in real terms.

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<sup>17</sup> This compared to \$243 per person in New Haven, \$140 per person in Durham and \$409 or more per person in Münster and similar German cities.

<sup>18</sup> For a description of these efforts see Madison (1995a).

<sup>19</sup> Kaplan 1993, p. 12.

<sup>20</sup> For instance, several months of discussion in 1990 surrounding a Task Force Soglin appointed brought out an entire litany of complaints about local housing, family support, health services, economic development, inadequate job training and declining commerce (Mayor's South Madison Steering Committee 1990). The Task Force recommended consolidation of existing neighborhood services, encouragement of home ownership in the area, and more study of ways to improve race relations. It also initiated a Little League team (Ragland 1997).

<sup>21</sup> Even efforts to address the problems of the southern neighborhoods into the 1990s continued to run up against racial barriers in markets in policymaking and markets. Mayor's South Madison Steering Committee 1990: B-10.

<sup>22</sup> Even during the heyday of growth coalitions in the 1960s, "a pervasive *moralism* and a concern with *aesthetics* and public amenities" had distinguished politics in Madison from many neighboring cities (Alford and Scoble 1969: 113).

<sup>23</sup> Madison Department of Planning and Development 1989, p. 33.

<sup>24</sup> See the detailed comparative assessment in Sellers (1999: 125).

<sup>25</sup> In nearby Bielefeld, under control of the SPD, the proposition climbed to 28 percent. But in other Länder the proportions in similar cities ranged lower: 19 percent in Freiburg, 16 percent in Göttingen.

<sup>26</sup> This amount from the 1995 city budget differed by no more than 6 percent from levels in three other similar mid-sized German cities (Bielefeld, Freiburg, Göttingen)

<sup>27</sup> With 80.5 full-time positions, the planning staff dwarfed the 23 positions in Madison. Positions charged with building code enforcement numbered 55, compared to 48 in Madison. But Münster also employed a total of 193 positions in environmental and parks offices, compared to 143 in Madison. Another 164 local employees worked on issues of land use administration in offices with no parallel in the Madison city government. Other German and U.S. cities reflected similar contrasts.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. Kersbergen 1995.

<sup>29</sup> *Supra* note --.



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<sup>30</sup> For instance, the statutory authorization for the City Planning Commission required three of seven members to be ordinary citizens and mandated public hearings with notice prior to decisions (93\_94 Wis. Stats. 62.23). Analogous boards, operating under similar procedures, decided on zoning appeals and historical preservation.

<sup>31</sup> See my comparison in (Sellers (2000, p.141).

<sup>32</sup> Unleaded gasoline prices in 1998 stood at \$.29 per liter, compared with \$.64 in Germany (OECD: 243). Taxation took up only 31% of this price, compared to 75% in Germany.

<sup>33</sup> These include not just “globalization,” but the parallel growth of localized governance within countries across the advanced industrial world. See Sellers (forthcoming).

<sup>34</sup> For one particularly sophisticated effort in this direction, see Wolman and Goldsmith (1992).